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ABSTRACT
A n  A p p lica tion  o f O ptim al 
C on trol T heory in  
W elfare E conom ics
by
Steven Scroggin
Dr. David Costa, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Mathematics 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
We consider the maximization of a functional representing social welfare over 
continuous time. A social welfare functional (SWF) is an integral that models social 
welfare as a function of individual consumption, individual utility of consumption 
and the value of utility aggregated across individuals. A SW F may be subject to 
constraints in the form of differential or integral equations and inequalities, which 
represent the production possibilities of the economy. We solve the optimization 
problem by applying the Pontryagin maximum principle. We consider an autarky and 
a command economy. We explore the interaction of impatience and productivity in 
autarky and the implications of different maxims of distributive justice in a command 
economy.
m
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This paper is an exercise in constructive utopianism. We assume a world with a 
simplified mathem atical structure and analyze what would be optimal in that world. 
.After considering a simple one-person society, we seek to optimize social welfare over 
numerous members of society, all with differing contributions, skills and needs, over 
continuous time.
Our principal m athem atical tool is the Pontryagin maximum principle. Simpler 
tools, such as classical Lagrange multipliers, allow us to find the optimal values of 
variables. The Pontryagin maximum principle allows us to find optimal functions 
within function spaces. In the context of our economic problem, we find the optim al 
path over time of consumption as well as the optimal path of other variables. The 
most mathematically challenging part of the paper is discussion of the Pontryagin 
maximum principle. Since social welfare is modeled as a functional, it is natural to 
consider it in terms of modem functional analysis.
We apply the Pontryagin maximum principle to an autarky, a one-person society. 
Our person is named “Robinson Crusoe” . The application of the Pontryagin max­
imum principle to  Robinson’s world is straightforward, and we derived closed-form
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
equations for his optimal consumption, stock and shadow price functions. We also 
consider how these would change if his technology changed or if his a ttitude  toward 
consumption now versus consumption later—his impatience—changed. Next we con­
sider how the results would look if his technology exhibited decreasing or increasing 
returns to scale. Using phase plane diagrams we see very different cases depending 
on returns to scale.
The next part is the conceptual core of this paper, the command economy. We 
consider the optimal choices of a benevolent dictator, the mentor of an ideal society. 
The command economy is utopian because its members contribute according to their 
ability, regardless of their compensation. Here we find solutions for a Social Welfare 
Functional (SWF) suggested by Sen, which incorporates utilitarianism and Bergsonisn 
weighting schemes as special cases.
Finally, we have conclusions and suggestions for further elaboration of the model.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW  AND 
BACKGROUND MATERIAL
Mathematics and economics have only a passing acquaintance, and the literature 
reflects this. We will not have the luxury of respecting the academic gulf between 
these disciplines. We draw from both camps, building an economic context for our 
problem, and forging the m athem atical tools to solve it. Since economics poses the 
problem, we start with economics.
We consider a question of welfare economics, “welfare” because it is the study 
of the welfare of society as a whole. Economists distinguish between the positive— 
what is—and the normative— what ought to be. The focus of welfare economics is 
normative. Its core question is “How should the fruits of our labors be distributed?” 
Welfare economics has a long and rich history; we need only review enough to put 
the mathematics into context. Welfare economics, without serious m athematics, is 
commonly taught at the undergraduate level. Mercuro [15], pages 25-50 contains an 
introduction addressed to  a sophisticated, though non-mathematical audience. Fur­
ther development of basic welfare economics may be found there. To focus the subject
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
matter further, we describe one particular set of concepts from a wide spectrum of 
conventionally accepted structures.
Turning to m athem atics, we will be preoccupied, m aybe obsessed, with the Pon­
tryagin maximum principle [17], which allows us to derive first order conditions for the 
maximum of a functional subject to constraints. We will consider the mathematics 
after the economics.
2.1 Economics
We optimize welfare as a function of the utility of the individuals who comprise society. 
To do this we will need “cardinal” utility functions. The following is a cursory review 
of the conceptual framework of that idea.
2 .1 . 1  Utility
We will treat the economizing activities of the individual mathematically as the choice 
of a particular point in “commodity space” ([9], page 142). A commodity is a  partic­
ular good or service. We assume there is a  finite num ber N  of available commodities. 
The quantities consumed by individual j  form a commodity bundle,
*"7 ~  ( ^ 1 J J  ^ 2 j  • • • C ^ j )  .
Mathematically, we assume Cjj ^ 0 , 6  R ,V t,j. Economically, we assume each com­
modity is “perfectly divisible” so that any non-negative quantity may be consumed 
and later we will allow consumption to vary with time.
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Commonly, the choice of a particular commodity bundle is said to  depend in part 
on the tastes of the individual. Tastes are summarized by a weak preference relation, 
'is preferred to or indifferent to” , written Hence
Cj > dj,
if and only if individual j prefers Cj to dj  or is indifferent between these bundles. 
Suppose individual j  is indifferent between cj  and dj, Cj ^  d j and d j  ^  Cy: we 
denote this by
Cj =  d j
People are not consistently rational in their preferences[13], but assuming they are, 
then the relation =  will be reflexive, symmetric and transitive. Hence it will partition 
the commodity space into equivalence classes. Further the relation ^  will be an 
ordering on those equivalence classes. We can define individual j ' s  utility as a function 
of time and consumption bundles,
u{t, c) ^  u(<, d) c(t) d(<),
where u is order-preserving, or “ordinal” . The function u tells us whether one bundle 
is preferred to another. The numerical difference, as assigned by the function u, is 
not a measure of the magnitude of the difference in preferences.
Suppose we impose a change that increases a ’s utility, u„, from 7 to 9 units; is 
this a bigger change than if we increased it from 20 to 23 units? If utility is ordinal, 
we cannot know. The units are meaningless.
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So, we will assume utility is “cardinal” , that utility differences are measureable. It 
is doubtful this could be done in practice. Many economists and philosophers object 
that people do not assign magnitudes to the utility differences between bundles. So 
our assumption is a strong assumption.
We further assume individual utilities are comparable. Social welfare is a func­
tional whose domain consists of the vectors of individual utilities and whose range 
is R  Comparability of utility between persons is, if anything, an even more objec­
tionable assumption. It makes a  strong political statement. It makes the claim that 
we can determine whether society is better off overall by a change th a t makes some 
of its members worse off. It is an essential tenet of the various forms of political 
collectivism that characterized the 2 0 th century.
By assuming away these difficult ethical issues, we diverge from the economic 
mainstream and the politically correct. Because the mainstream fails to perm it such 
comparisons, it bars the basic subject m atter of this paper. However, there is a sub­
stantial school which does adm it such assumptions, for example ([2 2 ], and references 
cited there). We are following this path.
We use u{t, #) to refer to utility at a  particular time, U refers to  a summation 
of u(t, #) over some time interval. Following convention[21], we assume declining 
marginal utility of consumption; mathematically: utility is twice continuously dif- 
ferentible, Uc > 0 and Ucc < 0 Also conventionally[12], we assume ‘^ am ” today is 
better than “jam ” tomorrow so, u* <  0 .
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We also assume that utility is time-additive [19]. By “tim e-additive” we mean
y* u{t,c)dt->r J  u{t,c)dt = J  u{t,c)dt, V r € [ a ,  6] (2.1)
Here we must distinguish between m athematics and the reality it is meant to mimic. 
A mathem atician may claim that (2.1) is an elementary theorem; however, human 
behavior may be inconsistent with this “theorem” . ([13], page 124).
Now we have developed a “well-behaved” utility function, Uj for individual j .
Uj =  j  Uj{t, Cj)dt
The next step is to aggregate these into a  social welfare function.
2.1.2 Welfare
How do we aggregate individual utilities into a scalar measure of society’s welfare? 
The history of economics is replete with proposals for the form of the social welfare 
functional(SW F). Ours is not to  debate the merits of these proposals. Instead, we will 
explore the consequences of various choices given our basic modelling assumptions. 
We sta rt with a fleeting review of the historical background.
Though the idea has an older pedigree(see [18], p. 33), Jerem y Bentham is gen­
erally regarded as the father of utilitarianism  [2]. Bentham claimed that “it is the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong” . 
He advocated that society, through legislation, should seek to  maximize the surplus 
of pleasure over pain aggregated across all citizens. We turn this philosophical idea 
into a mathematical one by equating the social welfare, W, with the sum of individual
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
utilities.
AT
H ' =  5 3 i/i(c).
J = l
But are ail utilities alike? W hat if someone has some special sensitivity to 
consumption—should we penalize a serene monk and reward a sybarite? How about 
the poor? Should we, or can we, further a goal of equality by weighting the utility of 
the poor more heavily? Such weighing schemes are called “Bergsonian” [10j.
Sen [23] proposes a SWF that includes utilitarianism and some kinds of Bergsonian 
functionals as special cases. Let
^  =  (2.2)
Sen’s reflects a  measure of solicitude toward the poorest members of society. A 
small 0 value favors the poor, a d  of one weighs all utility equally— the utilitarian 
criterion—and a. 0  of  more than one tilts in favor of the favorites of fortune. This 
last case is one Sen did not consider.
So far we have assumed that each person’s utility is independent of all other 
persons. W hat if this assumption is not true? Then for some persons j  we have 
Uj =  C/j(/i(ci), /aCca),. . . ,  Cj,. . . ,  fn(cn)) where there is an f ^  j  such tha t /<(c,) ^  0 . 
We can explore some species of altruism  in this structure.
2.2 Mathematics
We are considering the problem of maximizing social welfare subject to constraints. 
More generally, we seek to optimize some objective functional W{s, c). The objective
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
functional W  takes on real values. It depends upon s and c, where s is a vector 
representing the sta te  of our system, and c represents a vector of controls of the 
system. Through c—and only through c—we can affect the values W  assumes. The 
vector s depends on c, so it would be accurate to describe the functional as W{c). 
But we cannot simply optimize W.  (By “optimize” we mean either minimize or 
maximize, as required by the problem.) We must take into account lim itations on 
what is feasible. These limitations can be transformed to take the form of equalities 
or inequalities in s or c. By explicitly including s in W  we make it easier in the end 
to solve the problem.
There are at least three divergent approaches to constrained optim ization prob­
lems. They are (1 ) linear programming, (2) Lagrange multipUers and (3) the  Pontrya­
gin maximum principle. (It would be more precise to call it the “Pontryagin optimum 
principle” , but “maximum” is standard usage.) They differ in the assumptions made 
about the objective functional and the constraints. For linear program m ing we as­
sume that the controls are represented by a finite number of variables, and  that both 
the objective functional and the constraints are linear in the controls. For the La­
grange case, the objective functional and constraints need not be linear; it  is enough 
that they be differentiable. The Pontryagin case generalizes the Lagrange one. We 
allow states and controls to be elements of spaces of infinite dimension— typically 
piecewise continuous functions. The Lagrange case is particularly im portant as an 
intuitive example for the more general Pontryagin case.
Linear programming is the narrowest of the three cases. Here we assume the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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objective functional and the constraints are linear. Further, the states, s, do not 
appear explicitly and the controls, c, are represented by a finite num ber of variables. 
A linear programming maximum problem takes the general form:
max W{ci,C2 - . . c^f) =  7  bjCj,
C l,C 2 ...C s  *J=l
subject to
/ V
We have N controls and M constraints. T he goal is to maximize a linear combination
of the N controls. The constraints are represented by a m atrix of constants, A  =  (o, j ) .
We require tha t all the Cj controls, and the parameters, bj, a ,j  and yj  be nonnegative.
A classic example is the “fum iture-m aker’s problem" ([6 ] as described in [16]).
The fumiture-maker can produce four different kinds of desks; her production of type
one is cy, of type 2 , cg and so on. The volume of her output is insufficient to change
market conditions, so her profit per unit in each type of desk is a constant. Her profit
on type one desks is 61 =  12, on type two desks, 62 =  20, and so on. Her objective
functional, which she seeks to maximize is
4
bjCj =  12ci 4- 2 ÜC2 +  28c3 4- 4 OC4 .
i=i
Her constraints are 6,000 hours worth of time in the carpentry shop and 4,000
hours in the finishing shop per every six months. Each desk type requires different
amounts of carpentry and finishing. For z =  1, carpentry shop and z =  2, finishing
shop, her constraints are:
4
ciijCj = 4ci 4- 9c2 4- 7c3 4- IOC4 ^  6000.
j=i
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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4
5 3  jCj =  Ici + lC2 +  3 C3 4- 40C4 ^  4000.
J=l
The variables and the param eters are aU required to be non-negative.
The Simplex Algorithm is an efficient technique for solving this limited class of 
problems. It does not require any analysis; it is essentially algebraic manipulation 
[16]. Unfortunately, it also sheds little light on our problem of interest, so we move 
on.
If the objective functional or the constraints are non-linear in the control, then the 
Simplex Algorithm cannot be used. If the objective functional and the constraints 
are differentiable, we may be able to apply the Lagrange m ultiplier technique. The 
Lagrange technique is a special case of Pontryagin’s maximum principle. Accordingly, 
we do not give the traditional treatm ent here. It is developed with equality constraints 
in most calculus texts. A cookbook explanation with inequality constraints is ([10] 
.Appendix One). A more theoretical treatm ent is developed in [24].
If the control is a path  rather than a finite number of variables, then we need the 
Pontryagin maximum principle. The canonical example is the trajectory of a rocket. 
Optimizing rocket trajectories was Pontryagin s original motivation [17]. The paths 
of interest in this paper are less tangible. They are paths of consumption and capital 
stock over continuous time.
There are at least three different mathematical approaches to  Pontryagin s prob­
lem: (1 ) classic, (2) functional analysis, and (3) convex analysis. A good treatm ent of 
Pontryagin’s proof is [14]. An alternative is through functional analysis. The control
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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problem is treated as an abstract optimization problem on a function space subject 
to constraints. In the following chapter, we will follow this treatm ent as developed by 
[5]. Finally, the most general, abstract and intimidating treatm ent is through convex 
analysis ([4] and references cited there).
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CHAPTER 3
THE MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE THROUGH 
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
Here we review the Pontryagin Maximum Principle from the perspective of functional 
analysis. As noted in the literature review, this is neither the most general nor the 
narrowest context. It is sufficient to our purposes, and a variety of others.
We begin by establishing some notation and definitions. Then we pose the prob­
lem. After some preliminaries, we find first order conditions necessary for an optimum. 
Then we find additional assumptions rendering these conditions sufficient as well.
3.1 Notation
We begin with notation.
The notation to follow is burdensome; however, it allows us to express some com­
plex constructs precisely and elegantly. By “functional” we mean a function whose 
range is the real numbers, R  By “operator” we m ean a function whose domain is a 
normed space (or subset) of functions. A linear operator is bounded (in the sense tha t 
it maps bounded sets into bounded sets) if and only if it is continuous ([7 ], p. 25).
13
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We may therefore refer to bounded, continuous linear operators as continuous linear 
operators. We follow the following conventions of notation; Functions and variables 
are lower case, x{t). Fixed variables have zero subscripts, to, and fixed functions also 
have zero subscripts, Xo(t). We also use a zero subscript for a fixed open subset Xq 
of a normed space X .  Operators are upper case L or lower case Greek A, consistent 
with common usage.
Sets and spaces are in an upper case calligraphic font, X  or bold X . We shall be 
particularly interested in sets of functions whose elements are piecewise continuous 
functions from an interval I  C R to R". We denote this space P*, and define it 
carefully later. W hen we have a normed P” space we will give it a name, say M .  An 
element of A f  may be denoted n(«), but the use of n  for the dimension well as an 
element of such a space will not cause confusion because we do little that depends 
specifically on the dimension of a target space.
The dual space of a normed space X  is denoted X '  or X '. We also use the prime 
notation for derivatives, / '( z ) ,  and hopefully the difference appears from the context.
3.2 Definitions
In this section, the definitions are consolidated for reference. In some cases, the 
definitions embody significant assumptions or arguments.
Completion of a  space. We will define several P" normed vector spaces. Not every 
infinite Cauchy sequence of elements of these spaces converges to  another element of 
the space, in other words, P" spaces are not autom atically complete. But every
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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normed vector space can be completed. ([7], p. 28). When we refer to a P* space, 
we mean its completion, in other words, its Banach space.
Cone. A cone of a space is denoted S  d  X  or S C X . Formally, a  set 5  C is a 
cone if, VA € R f , A5 C 5  and 5  -I- 5  C «S, where R+ =  {( e  R |t >  0}.
The set
R+ =  {{Zi,Z2 --X„)|Zi >  0 ,Z2 > 0 , . . . i „  >  0 } 
is a cone in R ". So is
R - =  { { X i , X 2 . . . X n ) \ X i  < 0 , X 2  < 0 , . . . X n <  0}.
.Another cone, in polar coordinates, is
{ (r,0 ) | r ^ O , n < g ^ 6 } c R ^
Many of our cones are closed convex cones, as are each of the examples just given.
Convex se t. A set 5  C A' is convex if Vx,y €  5 , and 0 <  A <  1 , Ax-t-(l — A)y G S. 
The simplest (closed) convex set is the “line segment” joining two given points x, y G 
X  denoted [x, y]=  {Ax +  (1 — A)y)|0 <  A <  1}.
Convex function. A function, /  : A  —> R is convex if and only if, Vx, y and for 
0 < A <  1,
A/(x) +  (1 -  A)/(y) -  /(A x +  (1 -  A)y) G R+, (3.1)
Geometrically, a function /  is convex if a  line segment joining any two points of the 
graph of /  lies “above” the graph of / .  Symmetrically, a  function, f  : X  R  is 
concave if and only if, Vx, y and for 0 <  A <  1,
A/(x) +  (1 — A)/(y) — /(A x  +  (1 — A)y) G R_. (3.2)
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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A function, f  '■ X  y ,  where 5  is a convex cone in is <S-convex if and only if,
Vx, y and 0 < A < 1
A/(x) 4- (1 — A)/(y) — /(A x 4- (1 — A)j/) G S .
Dual space. The dual of a  normed space X ,  denoted A", is the set of continuous lin­
ear functions from A to R, hence it is the space of continuous linear functionals on X .  
In complete inner product spaces, Hilbert spaces, there is always an isomorphism—a 
one to one onto bicontinuous mapping—between a space and its dual.
Dual cone. Given a cone S  d  X ,  the dual cone of S ,  denoted S ' ,  is
S '  =  {p G «S'I (Vs G S)  p(s) ^  0}.
In words. S '  is the set of continuous linear functionals which m ap elements of the 
cone S  to R+. Some of our (generalized) Lagrange m ultipliers are elements of dual 
cones. Dual cones are sometimes called “polar” cones.
Fréchet Derivative. Prechet differentiation is a generalization of classical differen­
tiation to functions whose domain or range (or both) is not the reals. Just as a classic 
derivative is the linear approximation (tangent plane) of a  function a t a point; the 
FYechet derivative is the linear approximation of an operator at some point (which 
may be a function) in its domain. Precisely, if X  and y  are Banach spaces—complete 
normed spaces—then G : X  —^ ^  is Frechet differentiable at o G A  if there is a 
continuous, linear map G '(a) such that
G(a 4- x) — G(a) =  G '(a)x 4- w(o, x ).
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where
lim ! % M = o .
I N I - » o  I I  X  I I
We often use “Frechet” as shorthand for “Fréchet differentiable” or “Fréchet deriva­
tive” .
Induced ordering. Suppose 5  is a convex cone in X .  The induced ordering of S,  
denoted < , is defined by z  y  if and only if y  — x €  «S. Note that, for S  =  R+. C  
R, X < , y ^  y — X > 0. We will use induced orderings in our proof of sufficient 
conditions.
Interior of a  Cone. The interior of a cone is the set of elements of the cone which 
have some neighborhood contained entirely within the cone. In euclidean spaces, a 
cone may have an empty interior when the dimensionality of the cone is less than 
that of the space in which it is embedded. For example, in every countable set 
of rays from the origin has empty interior. But a  ray from the origin in R does 
not have empty interior. Cones which represent inequalities may have a non-empty 
interior while sets represented by equalities in the same space have empty interiors. 
We denote the interior of a cone Ç by “in t(^)” .
Locally Solvable. Consider a generalized statement of our problem:
^ n { / ( x )  : g{x) €  G}.
Let a E X  satisfy the constraint, g{a) €  G, and d E X ,  where d  represents a  direction 
from a. If 3 (i > 0  such th a t
g{a) + g'{a)d E G and ||d|| <  5 =► f { a ) d  > 0,
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then the problem is called ‘"regular” at a. The problem is locally solvable a t a if the 
constraint g(x)  €  G has solutions x  (for a  >  0 small) of the form:
X =  a +  a d  +  T /(a) ,
where
U m ! h M I = 0 .Q-»0 Oc
Suppose p is an affine function, in other words, g is of the form h(x)  +  b where h is 
linear and h is a  constant. Then the problem is locally solvable a t any solution a of 
the constraint g{a) € G- Also, it can be shown that a  locally solvable problem at a 
minimum point a  € A' is necessarily regular at a.
space. A function /  is an element of P  if /  : /  —^ where /  is an interval 
on the real line and /  is piecewise continuous. Unless otherwise stated, P  spaces 
are associated with the uniform or sup norm, ||/(*)||oo =  sup^ç/ |/ ( t ) | .  P  spaces are 
taken to be complete normed vector spaces, in other words, Banach spaces.
Transpose. Given a linear m ap A  : X  —¥ y ,  the transpose > A" is the
linear map defined by [A’^ y’)x =  y'Ax,  Vx 6  A" and y' €  y^. If  A is a m atrix (here it 
usually is not), then is represented by the transpose m atrix.
Weak * closed. A “weak * neighborhood” of a point x €  A" is any set of the form,
=  {y € A" : |y(s,-) -  x(sj)| <  c, (i =  1 ,2 . . .  r)},
where e > 0 and {sj} is any set of finitely-many elements of X .  A set T  C A" is “weak 
* closed” if every point x € A "\T  has a weak * neighborhood N{x)  which does not 
intersect T . So weak * limits of sequences of elements in T  converge to elements of
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T . In spaces of finite dimension, “closed” and “weak * closed” are the same. Weak * 
closed is always with reference to a dual space, though there may be an isomorphism 
between a space and its dual. Also, note that weak * closed =»- closed.
Finally, some comments about our “spaces” are in order. We will assume all of 
our spaces are vector spaces. We assume therefore that scalar multiplication and 
vector addition of elements of our sets yield more elements of that set. On the other 
hand, we will be using boundary conditions, for example s(0) =  1 and s ( l)  =  0. 
Unfortunately, the set of functions meeting these boundary conditions is not a vector 
space. Consider, for example, the set
5  =  (s € A'ls(O) =  1, s ( l)  =  0},
where X  is the vector space of, say, continuous functions, s : [0,1] —> R  If si(t)  €  S  
and S2 {t) e  S  then s(t) =  si{t) + S2 (t) is such that s(0) =  2, hence s(t) ^  S.  But this 
is not too hard to fix. If s(a) =  c and s{b) =  d, we define s(t) =  s{t) — c — — a).
It is then easy to show that {s|s €  5} meets the definition of a vector space. So we 
can and do assume our spaces are vector spaces.
3.3 Plan of Proof and Preliminaries 
Our plan, based loosely on Craven [5j is as follows:
(1) We state the “Abstract Problem” and associate with it another problem, the 
“Linear Problem.”
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(2 ) We prove the Linearization Theorem: At an optim um  of the Abstract Problem, 
the Linear Problem has no solution.
(3) We state M otzkin’s Theorem: If the Linear Problem has no solution then certain 
“necessary” conditions hold.
(4) We next prove conditions under which a Fréchet function is «S-convex as a lemma 
for a
(5) Proof that, with suitable convexity assumptions, the necessary conditions are 
sufficient.
(6 ) We prove the Pontryagin Maximum Principle for the A bstract Problem. Then 
we show how a general optimal control problem may be stated in terms of 
the Abstract Problem, and the Principle applied. Finally, we show how the 
conditions simplify in the cases we shall be considering in the following chapters.
The Abstract Problem . The Abstract Problem is
min{W (u) : - g ( u )  e  G, - h { u )  6  H}tiÇUo
where is an open subset of a Banach space U, G is a, convex cone in a Banach 
space y  with in t(^) #  0, and % is a closed convex cone in a  Banach space Z .  The 
objective functional, W: i /  —> R, the constraint functions, g : U y  and h :14 —¥ Z ,  
are Fréchet.
Typically, U  is some P" space, g represents inequalities and h  represents equalities. 
The inequalities may be strict “< ” or non-strict “< ” . As a  m atter of convention, we
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want all the inequalities as “< ” or “< ” rather than or “> ” hence a constraint 
which could be expressed as g{u) > 0  is expressed instead as —y(u) <  0 .
The Linear Problem . The Linear Problem at a fixed point u ’ e Uq is
—Aq = 0, —Bq E int(R+ x Ç)
where
A =  [/i'(u*) h{u')] 
is a continuous linear map, A  : 14 x R Z ,
B  = W'{u')  gf{u*) g{u
0 1 -)\
is a continuous linear map, J 3 : W x R — and
where d E 14 and j3 E R- Note that, for example, h'{u*) has the same domain and 
range as h, being the linear approximation to h at u*. Here h'{u*)d means h'{u*) 
applied to d, which is an element of Z,  while h{u*)0 is the product of a  vector in Z  
and a real number
3.1. Linearization Theorem . Consider the Abstract Problem, and its associated 
Linear Problem at u*. If u* is a  local minimum for the Abstract Problem, and the 
constraint h{u) E H  is locally solvable a t u*, then the Linear Problem has no solution.
Proof. We proceed by assuming the Linear Problem at u* has a solution q and, 
since h  is locally solvable at u*, we find that u* cannot be a  minimum for the Abstract 
Problem, a contradiction.
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€ ZY X R is aSuppose u* is a solution to the Abstract Problem and q =  
solution to the Linear Problem. Then
Aq =  h'{u*)d 4- h{u')0 =  0.
Since h(u*) =  0 we obtain, for 7  € R
/i(u’)7 +  {h’{u*)d +  h{u*)0) =  0.
Taking 7  > 0 large enough so that d =  (^ +  7 ) " y  satisfies ||d|| <  6 and dividing the 
above equality by (/3 -r 7 ) we have
h{u*) + h'{u')d =  0 .
This is the premise for local solvability, so we know h{x) =  0 has a solution of the 
form X =  u* -r ad  -i- r/(a), for any a  > 0  sufficiently small, where
Urn 2 W . 0 ,
Q->0 Or
Now we can show that such an x is a better solution than u* to the Abstract 
Problem. Indeed, since W  is Fréchet, we have
W{x) — W{u*) =  W  {u* + otd + ^{0 )) — W  {u")
=  W ( u ' ) ( a d 4 - q ( a ) )  4 - 6 ( a )
=  a W \ v r ) d  + W \vT )v{a )  +  d{oc).
where
o->0 O'
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Since VF'(u’) is continuous, and we are given in the Linear Problem that —W'{u')d E 
int(R+), it follows from the above that VV{x) < W{u*)  for small a.
Similarly, g is Fréchet and
g W  -  g ( u ' )  =  g ( u * - r  Ckd-t Tj(cx)) -  g (u*)
=  ag'(u')d + g ' ( u * ) ( T j ( a ) ) p ( a ) ,
hence
-g (x )  =  -g ( t t ' )  -  a g \ u ' ) d  -  y'(u*)(r7(a)) -  p{a)
=  —y(tx’) 4- a0g{u*) -  ag'{u*)d — aj3g{u*) — g'{u')-q{a) -  p{a)
=  (1 -  a 0 ) { - g { u ‘)) 4- a{-g'{u*)d  -  g{u*)0) +  Ç{a).
where
Q - + 0  ct o - f O  a
Note that —g{u*) E Ç hy the Abstract Problem, and —g'{u*)d — g{u’)P E int(^), 
by the Linear Problem, so —g{x) E Ç for sufficiently small a . Hence x  is consistent 
with the constraint and we have already shown x is a better solution than tx*, a 
contradiction. Hence there is no q which is a solution of the Linear Problem. ■
3.2. Motzkin Theorem . Given the Abstract Problem, and the Linear Problem at 
u*. if the cone A7'{H*) is weak * closed, then exactly one of the following two problems 
has a solution:
(i) The Linear Problem,
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(ii) t W { u')  4- p.g \u ')  4- vh'{u*) =  0, pg{u’) =  0, i/h{u*) =  0, where r  €  R+,/x 6 
Ç', I' E Ti'  and r, /x are not both zero.
X  proof is given in Craven ([5], p. 32).
3.3 «S-convex Lemma. Let /  : A' —> ^  be Fréchet differentiable. Let 5  C 3^  be a
closed convex cone. Then /  is 5-convex if and only if, Vx, y € A’,
f i x )  -  /(y )  -  / '(x ) (x  - y )  e S  (3.3)
where f  is the Fréchet of / .
Proof. Let x , y  E X  and 0 <  A <  1. If /  is «S-convex, then, by definition (see 
“convex function” )
A /(x) 4- (1 — A)/(y) — /(A x 4- (1 — A)y) E S.
But, «S is a convex cone, so
A /(x) 4- (1 — A)/(y) — /(A x 4- (1 — A)y) € A«S.
Dividing by A and rearranging terms,
/(z) -  /(„) -  ny±.M^-vïL-Ay)  ^s.
If we take the limit as A -4 0 we have a element of S  since S  is closed. We obtain
f i x )  -  f i y )  -  f i y ) i x  - y )  e S,
as required.
Conversely, suppose
f i x )  -  f i y )  -  / '(y )(x  - y )  e S ,  Vx, y  E X .  (3.4)
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Let 0 <  A < 1. Keeping in mind the condition for 5-convexity, we write
^ f { x )  -I- (1 — A)/(y) — /(A x 4- (1 — A)y) =
^  i f {x )  — /(A x 4- (1 — A)y)) 4- (1 — A) { f iy )  — /(A x 4- (1 — A)y)), (3.5)
by adding and then subtracting A/(Ax 4 - ( 1  — A)y).
We work first w ith the first part of (3.5),
A (/(x ) — /(A x 4- (1 — A )y)).
Using the hypothesis (3.4) and the induced ordering on S ,  we can write
A(/(x) -  /(A x +  (1 -  X)y))  > , A/'(Ax -F (1 -  A)y)(l -  A)(x -  y).  (3.6)
Similarly, for the second part of (3.5) we can write
(1 -  A)(/(y) — /(A x 4- (1 — A)y) > , ( 1  — A)/'(Ax 4- (1 — X)y)X{y  — x). (3.7)
Combining (3.6) and (3.7) with (3.5) and writing z  =  Ax 4- ( 1  — A)y for simplicity, we 
obtain
A/(x) +  ( 1  -  A )/(y) -  f { z )  > , A /'(z )(l -  A)(x -  y) -F (1 -  A)/'(z)A(y -  x)
Since f '{z)  is linear, we conclude that
A/(x) 4- (1 — A )/(y) — f { z )  >a A( 1  — A )/'(z)(x — y) 4- (1 — X) Xf ' { z ) {y  — x) =  0 .
Since we have shown that
A /(x) +  (1 -  A)/(y) -  /(A x -F (1 -  A)y) > , 0,
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it follows that
A/(x) +  (1 — A)/(y) — /(A x +  (1 — A)y) 6  S,
hence that /  is 5-convex. ■
3.4. Sufficient Conditions Theorem. Given (1) the Abstract Problem, (2) neces­
sary' conditions for a local minimum at u =  u*, specifically,
t W { u * )  +  p g ' { u * )  +  v h ' { u * )  =  0 ,  p g { u * )  =  0 ,  i / h { u * )  =  0 ,
where r  G R+,/x E Ç*,u E7i*  with r,/x not both zero, and (3) suitable convexity, 
specifically: W  is convex, g is (int ^)-convex, and h is %-convex, then u* must be a 
minimum for the Abstract Problem.
Proof. Suppose not, suppose instead tha t tx =  tx* is not a m i n i m u m .  Then there 
must he  a  V E 14q with lV(v) < W{u*), —g{v) E Ç, —h(v) E Let p = v ~  tx*. Since 
W  is convex and a functional,
W{v)  -  M/(tx") -  W \ u ' ) i v  -  tx*) G R+
by the 5-convex Lemma, so
W\u*){v  -  tx*) =  W '(u ' )p  < 0. (3.8)
Next, also by the 5-convex Lemma,
g{v) -  y(tx*) -  y'(tx*)p G int(^),
whereas g{v) E —Q so
~ ( g ( v )  -  y(tx*) -  g ' ( u ' ) p )  +  g ( v )  E  ( - in t(g ))  -F ( -Ç )
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hence
g{u*) +  g{u ')p  e  - in t(g ) .  (3.9)
Now, if r  >  0 we get rW'(u*)p < 0 from (3.8); on the o ther hand, if 0 ^  p  E Ç* we 
obtain from (3.9) that
g'iu')?) < 0,
hence pg'{u*)p < 0 follows from pg{u*) =  0. Since either r  >  0 or p ^  0, we conclude 
that
(rW '(u ’) -r p g \u ' ) )p  < 0.
Finally, with similar reasoning, we can show uh'{u')p < 0, hence
{ W \u - )  +  pg\u-)  +  yh'{u-)){p) < 0,
a contradiction of the necessary conditions. Hence there is no better choice than u*, 
and the necessary conditions are sufficient for an optim um . ■
3.4 The Pontryagin Maximum Principle
We prove the Principle for the Abstract Problem. We then consider the “special” 
case of a general Optimal Control Problem, and, lastly, optim al control problems of 
the type we will face later.
The Pontryagin Maximum Principle for the Abstract Problem . Given (1 ) the Ab­
stract Problem and its Linear Problem, (2) h{u) E H,  locally solvable at u* EUq, (3)
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is weak * closed, where A  is defined in the Linear Problem, then a necessary 
condition for the A bstract Problem to a ttain  a local minimum at u =  u* is
rW'{u*)  4- pg'{u*) 4- uh'{u') =  0, pg{u*) =  0, uh{u') = 0
where r  E R+,/x E Ç*,u E H ' ,  with r,/x not both zero. If, further, W is convex, g is 
(int ^)-convex and h  is %-convex, then u* must be a minimum.
Proof. Suppose the Abstract Problem attains a  minimum at tx* €  14. Since 
h{u) E H is locally solvable at tx* we can apply the Linearization Theorem and 
conclude that the Linear Problem has no solution. Since A7'{H') is weak * closed, 
we can apply the Motzkin Theorem and conclude th a t since the Linear Problem has 
no solution, necessarily the system,
t W \ u*) 4- pg'iu') 4- vh'{u*) =  0, /xy(tx') =  0, uh{u*) =  0,
does have a solution, where r 6 R + , / x G ^ * , i / 6  'H*. and r  > 0 or /x ^  0. Given the 
convexity assumed, such conditions are also sufficient for a minimum, by the Sufficient 
Conditions Theorem. ■
Now consider the following “Optimal Control Problem ”, and see that it is a special 
case of the Abstract Problem:
m in {W(s, c) : Ds =  M(s, c), P (s) G P ,Q (c ) € Q}. (3.10)a6<S,c€C
We are optimizing over feasible states s(t) and controls c(t), 0 ^ T .  We usually
omit the dependence on t  to simplify the notation. The objective function W —that 
which we seek to optimize—is a functional, W  : 5  x  C R. The next three term s are
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the constraints, (1 ) a differential equation, (2) a constraint on s expressed in terms 
of a convex cone P , and (3) a constraint on c, expressed in terms of another convex 
cone, Q. We assume all the operators, W, D, M, P and Q, are Frechet differentiable.
The first constraint term, D(s) =  M(s, c), is a differential equation where D is the 
differentiation operator. For example, in the next chapter a typical constraint is
s(t) =  s(t)r — c(t) (3.11)
where s is the state function, c is the control function and r  is a scalar parameter. 
Define 72. =  P ”. We require that all s G 5  C P  be such that s  = f  T\{t)dt for some 
Ti G 72., and that s(0) =  s ( l)  =  0. We say Ds =  ri when s = f  ri{t)dt and define 
D =  ^  except at points of discontinuity of D. The linear operator D : 5  —> 72. is 
made continuous by giving S  the (non-standard) norm ||s|| =  ||s||oo +  ||Ds||oo> the 
so-called “graph” norm. The point of this exercise is to ensure that D is continuous; 
the classical differential operator is not continuous ([7], p. 139.)
The space C is rather more prosaic since C =  P .
M is the operator M : 5  x  C —> 72 defined by M(s, c)(t) =  m{s{t),c{t),t) where 
m :R ’' X R  X R —» P  is Fréchet. In (3.11), we have
m(s(t),  c(t), t) =  m{s{t), c{t)) = s{t)r — c(f).
The next two terms represent inequality constraints as closed convex cones. Sup­
pose we have an inequality such as f{ t )  ^  to. We can express it in terms of the 
cone R+ C  R as P (/( t))  =  to — / ( t )  G R+. However, we must generalize this a little  
and speak of sets of functions which are taken to be cones because their images lie
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within other cones. Expressing this requires three different sets, (1 ) a convex cone in 
a euclidean space V  , (2) the space P  and (3) the subset P  of P  such that its 
elements have images entirely within V. We define two of these creatures
P  =  { p 6 P | ( V t G / ) p ( t ) G P } ,
and
Q =  { 9  € P |(V t 6  I)q{t) G Q},
where Q is convex cone in P .  We will assume both P  c  P  and Q C P  have 
nonempty interior. Then the corresponding cones P  c  P  and Q C P  are also 
convex and have nonempty interiors.
Now we can make the Optimal Control Problem (3.10) into an A bstract Problem. 
Consolidate s and c into a new function u = {s.c) E S  x  C = 14.
Let 3  ^ =  ?2 x C = P x P  and define the convex cone ^  =  P  x Q c  3^  with 
int(^) ^  0. Accordingly, define the constraint —g{u) E G, where g : 14 y  is given 
by g{u) =  ( -P ( s ) ,  -Q (c)).
On the other hand, the constraint, Ds =  M(s, c) can be w ritten as an equality
constraint —h{u) G 7Z =  0 in the Abstract Problem, where h : 14 Z  is given by
h{u) = Ds — M(s, c) and Z  =  72 =  P .  We will assume the linear m ap
V =  [D — M,(so, Co) : — Mc(sq, cq)]
maps U onto Z  for some uq =  (sq, co) G 14. Then, the constraint h{u) =  0 is locally 
solvable at uq ([5], p. 59). Moreover, since Ti* =  {0}* =  Z',  it follows th a t V ^(‘W*) =  
[h'(uo) : h{uo)]'^iZ') is weak * closed.
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That does it. We have transformed the Optim al Control Problem (3.10) into an 
Abstract Problem, satisfying all the conditions of the Pontryagin Maximum Principle. 
Then for u =  (s, c) to  be at a minimum, uq =  (so,cü), necessarily, in terms of the 
Abstract Problem,
rW '(uo) +  py'(uo) 4- uh'{uo) =  0, pg{uo) =  0, uh{uo) =  0
where r 6 R 4- , / x G ^ * , t ' €  %* =  {0}* =  Z',  with r , p not both zero.
If r  =  0  and the sufficient conditions for an optimum are satisfied, it can be 
shown ([5] p. 65) th a t the solution must be unique. In this case, the O ptim al Control 
Problem (3.10) is not a  problem in optimal control at all, the unique solution being, 
trivially, the optimal one. We will ignore this degenerate case and assume r  ^  0. 
Further, we can divide through by r  and restate the condition, hence we take r  =  1 . 
Similarly if /z =  0 and i/ = 0 then the problem reduces to an unconstrained case. We 
will also ignore this degenerate case.
Now we can sta te  the conditions in terms of our Optimal Control Problem (3.10):
W ,  4 - p i ( —P , )  — 4 - A(—M 5) =  0 ,
W c  4- P2{—Q c) 4- A (—M e ) =  0 ,
Dsq —M(so,co) =  0, (3.12)
/^iP(so) =  0 , and 
PiQico) =  0,
where the Lagrange multipliers Pi{t) ,p 2 {t) and X{t) are functions representing the 
functionals p  E G* and u E Z '  ([5], p. 17). The partial derivatives symbolized by
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subscripts, such as W,, are evaluated a t (so((), co(t)). These conditions are collectively 
known as Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Let us assume that the sufficient conditions are satisfied. Since we are taking 
V. =  {0}, the requirement that h{u) be K-convex means that h{u) =  Ds — M(s, c) 
must be affine, and so M(s, c) must also be affine. But a close look at the proof of 
the Sufficient Conditions Theorem 3.4 shows that the proof works for M(s, c) concave 
(hence h{u) convex), with A(t) >  0. Similarly, it also works for M(s, c) convex (hence 
h{u) concave) with A(t) <  0. To sum up, if W  is convex, -P is int(P)-convex, and -Q 
is int(Q)-convex, M is affine or concave with A(t) > 0, or convex with A(t) < 0, then 
we have sufficient conditions for a min i m u m .
Next, we will define the so-called Hamiltonian H{s, c. A) of our Optimal Control 
Problem (3.10) and rewrite conditions (3.12) in terras of H.  Define the Hamiltonian,
H(s, c. A) =  W (s, c) 4- A(Ds — M(s, c)). (3.13)
Then the conditions (3.12) can be written as
QTf
—  =  W , +  A ( - M J = / X 2 Qc,
3 H
-qJ  =  W , 4 -A(—M,) — Â = /iiP ,, and (3.14)
d H
—  =  Dso -  M(so, Co) =  0. 
coupled with the so-called transversality conditions,
/XiP(so) =  0,
/^zQCch) =  0.
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In the following chapters the constraints P and Q are the requirement th a t the state 
variable s and control variable c be non-negative. It will turn out th a t all of our 
solutions comply with this requirement automatically. In other words, the constraints
represented by P and Q are not binding. Hence pi  and p 2 are identically zero. This
fact is a consequence of the form of the boundary conditions. If, for example, we took 
the end time, T, as an unknowm value instead of a fixed parameter, some transversality 
conditions would be binding ([1 2 ], Chapter 7; [24], Chapter 1 0 ).
Once again, we rewrite conditions (3.12) in terms of another, classical, Hamilto­
nian obtained from (3.13) by omitting the term Ds and substituting —p  for A. We 
define this Hamiltonian (otherwise keeping the same notation) as
H(s, c,p) =  W(s, c) 4 -pM (s, c). (3.15)
In the case of non-binding transversality conditions we obtain from (3.14)
f
BFf
—  =  -p ,  and (3.16)os
dH
We have arrived a t the classical statement of the Pontryagin Maximum Principle, 
which is equivalent to the necessary conditions (3.14) for an optimum of the Optimal 
Control Problem (3.10).
In this argument we have found conditions for a minimum. It can be shown ([12], 
p. 213) that the same conditions are necessary for a maximum, and sufficient if the 
Optimal Control Problem (3.10) is concave in s and c. We will use this classical form
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of the Principle to find necessary conditions for the models in the following chapters. 
W ith one exception, which we point out, the models are concave.
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AUTARKY
Autarky is a policy of national self-sufficiency and nonreliance on imports or 
economic aid; a self-sufficient region or country, from the Greek autarkeia, self- 
sufficiency[l]. Here we treat the self-sufficient region as a unit. It acts as if it were 
an individual. We call this the Robinson Crusoe problem.
We first consider a  case with constant returns to scale. This case is the  m athem at­
ically simplest of those we will consider and shows the features of our model which 
are not issues of collective choice. The analysis expands upon ([12] p. 135). Later 
we consider what happens if Robinson’s technology exhibits decreasing, or increas­
ing returns to scale. Neither of these cases lend themselves to closed-form solutions. 
Further, we will see th a t the increasing returns case is convex, hence we can describe 
consequences of necessary conditions, but cannot know if they are sufficient for an 
optimum.
35
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4.1 Robinson Crusoe
Robinson is stranded alone on a desert island over a period of time of known length, 
t G [0, r ] .  He is shipwrecked at time zero and rescued a t time T. Defoe’s Robinson 
was stuck for 28 years. We assume foresight the literary hero Robinson Crusoe[8 ] was 
denied; we assume we know T.
Robinson has minimal resources at first. These resources are undifferentiated 
“stuff” . So- We assume Crusoe may apply stuff as easily to consumption as pro­
duction. The unknown rate at which he consumes stuff is c(t). If he applies stuff 
productively, it will appreciate at the rate r , a constant. Hence the growth of his stuff 
s{t) is described by a differential equation,
i( t)  =  s{t)r -  c{t). (4.1)
We also assume Robinson will consume all of his resources by time T  so s{T) = 0. 
The boundary conditions are therefore
s(0) =  So, and s(T) =  0. (4.2)
Also he is subject to the transversality constraints,
c{t) ^  0, and s(f) ^  0, Vt. (4.3)
Robinson derives utility from his consumption. His utility function has the form 
u(t, c) where >  0 , Ucc <  0 , tt* <  0 ; tx is twice continuously differentiable in c and 
once continuously differentiable in t. Robinson’s utility function has a specific form
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complying with these requirements. The particular form we chose yields closed form
solutions:
u{t, c) =  6 “*“ ln(c).
The param eter “d” is a positive scalar constant representing his patience, or lack of it. 
Since Robinson’s economy is an autarky, his welfare is the same as society’s welfare,
W  = U =  r  e~'^^ln{c{t))dt. (4.4)
Jo
Robinson’s problem is then to maximize his welfare (4.4) subject to the differential 
constraint (4.1), the boundary conditions (4.2) and transversality conditions (4.3). 
Here c{t) is the control variable and s(t) is the state variable. We solve this problem 
by forming the classical Hamiltonian (3.15) and applying the maximum principle 
(3.16). A solution will give an optimal consumption function c*(t) for Robinson’s 
consumption and an optimal path  for his stock of stuff s'{t).  As an added bonus, we 
obtain a shadow price function p*{t), the value of an additional unit of stock at any 
particular time.
Form the Hamiltonian (sometimes suppressing the arguments of functions to sim­
plify notation),
H  =  ln(c) 4- p (rs  — c). (4.5)
Take derivatives.
d H
-3 — =  pr, and os
ÔH
3 ^  =
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For an optimum, the maximum principle will apply:
 p =  0, (4.6)
c
p r =  —p, and (4.7)
rs  — c =  s (4.8)
Working first with (4.7) we obtain
p(t) =
where ki is a constant. Substituting this into (4.6) and rearranging terms gives
c{t) =  (4.9)
Now, to tackle (4.8), recall the formula for the solution of a general first order 
differential equation([1 1 ], p. 31). If
y' 4F yP{t)  =  R{t),
and H{t) =  f  P{t)dt, then necessarily
y(f) =  ^y* e^^*^R{t)dx + ^2  ^ ,
where k2 is a constant. Letting P{t) =  —r  and
i 2 (t) =  - c  = -----  — ,
Ki
we obtain
s{t) =  e I y  e —   dt  -F A:2
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
39
Consumption
3 0
2 5
20
10
Time
Figure 4.1: Robinson’s Consumption Function
After simplifying
g t(r -d )
dki (4.10)
We have the boundary conditions s{T) = 0 and s(0) =  so- Let us further specify 
for a particular solution tha t T  =  1 and gq =  1 . Substituting the boundary conditions 
into (4.10) we end up with:
ki = 1 — e
-d
d
o-d
ko *
—  1
If we make assumptions for r  and d we can graph the optimal solutions. In the 
following figures we assume the “specification assumptions” ,
s(0) =  1 , s{T)  =  0, r  =  1 , r  =  8.4, d = 7. (4.11)
The assumption r  =  8.4 corresponds to a 30% per annum rate over 28 years. Robin­
son’s consumption function (Figure 4.1) is
c(t) = (4.12)
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Stock
2
1 .
0 .
Time
Figure 4.2: Robinson’s Stock o’ Stuff 
Robinson’s stock (Figure 4.2) is
s ( t )  =
e ^ - 1
and the shadow price of Robinson’s stock (Figure 4.3) is
We see Robinson accumulate stock for about the first two-thirds of his stay, and 
then rapidly consume it. This path for his stock supports a  consistent exponential 
increase of consumption. The shadow price function shows th a t additional resources 
would be extremely valuable at the beginning, but this value rapidly drops off.
The parameter d is a  measure of Robinson’s impatience, o r maybe desperation. If 
d is relatively high, Robinson is unwilling to invest much for future returns. We can 
see the effect of impatience on his prosperity if we take a  derivative with respect to
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P r ic e
0 . 0 6
0 . 0 2
Figure 4.3: Robinson’s Price Function
dc{t) ad-d t+ Tt
dd  -  1)2
In Figure 4.4 we have for the specification assumptions (4.11). If rf increases
by one unit, Robinson gives up roughly 85% of his consumption a t the end, to  get an 
increase of about 14% in his consumption at the beginning.
( d o / d d ) ( 1 / c )
- 0 . 2
- 0 . 4
— 0 .  6
- 0 . 8
Time
Figure 4.4: Robinson’s Im patience Function
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What if Robinson improves his technology, represented by r?
dc{t)
dr 1 — e- d
Here, since d > 0 both the num erator and denominator are positive so the deriva­
tive is positive—also an intuitively appealing result. Better technology yields more 
consumption. Unfortunately for an im portunate Robinson, the payoff for innovation 
is heavily weighted towards the end of his stay. Figure 4.5, plots for thedr c(t)
specification assumptions (4.11).
(dc/dr)(1/c)
0 .
0 .
0 .
0 .
Time
Figure 4.5: Robinson’s Innovation Function
4.2 Robinson with Non-Homogeneous Returns to Scale 
The generalization we consider here is to (4.1). Instead of
s{t) =  s(t)r  -  c(t).
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we assume
s{t) =  s(t)“r  — c{t).
If a  =  1, we have the original case. If a  <  1 we have decreasing returns to scale. If 
a  > 1 we have increasing returns to scale.
We form the Hamiltonian as before, take partials as before, and set them according 
to the maximum principle as follows:
e~‘^
 p  =  0, (4.13)
c
rap s“~' =  —p, and (4.14)
rs“ — c =  i.
Note that this system is non-Ünear in s if a  #  1. There are no familiar techniques for 
finding explicit solutions for this system of non-linear ordinary differential equations. 
Still, we can derive some insight from a phase plane diagram. Such a  diagram graphs 
the answer to the question, in our context, what is the future path  of stock s and 
consumption c for a given stock sq and consumption co? We seek to plot s against c, 
and show for each point in the field, a vector reflecting the path from th a t point. This 
requires solving explicitly for s and c as functions of s and c and some parameters, 
but to have something we can graph, we must eliminate time as an explicit argument 
as well as other functions of time such as p. Take the derivative of (4.13) with respect 
to time:
p = -  (4.15)
Substitute (4.15) and (4.13) into (4.14) to eliminate p and p, rearrange the terms and
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obtain
c =  c (ra s“~‘ — d) (4.16)
along with
à  =  — c. (4.17)
The graphs were prepared using Mathematica. a  program  for m athem atical com­
puting. The technical details are described in the section 4.3 of this chapter. S tarting  
with the most familiar case, suppose a  =  1. Figure 4.6 is the resulting plot with 
stock, s, on the vertical axis and consumption, c, on the horizontal axis, for the  spec­
ification assumptions (4.11). Along the s =  0 line, stock is stationary. Consumption 
is non-decreasing, and c =  0 is the line c =  0. Illustrative paths are based on th e  set 
of initial values
(so, Cb) =  {(1, 5), (1, 7), (1,9), (1,11), (1,13), (1,15), (1,17), (1,19)}
in this and the following figures. In this constant returns to scale case we also can find 
cl since we were able to solve explicitly for c{t) in (4.12). For the constant returns 
case and the specification assumptions (4.11) we have
Co =  -—- —-T ~  7.00639.1 — e“®
Returning to Figure (4.6), for the starting value {sq,Cq) =  (1,5), c rises slowly 
while s rises rapidly. For cq =  7, the relationship is linear, which may be confirmed 
by working with (4.16) and (4.17). For cb =  5 and cq =  7 the boundary conditions 
are violated, since s increases without limit, so these are not practical solutions.
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Figure 4.6: Constant Returns to Scale, a  =  1
However, for a very slightly higher cq we have the solution found in the previous 
section. Compare the path for eg »  7.00639 with Figure 4.1 and note tha t they are 
consistent in that consumption rises monotonically; compare with Figure 4.2 and note 
that it is consistent with eg % 7.00639 it in that the stock rises until some point, and 
then falls rapidly. For cq > 8.4 on the other hand, s consistently falls while c rises.
Now it is natural to  consider what path  optimizes Robinson’s u tility  if he experi­
ences decreasing returns to scale. Decreasing returns to scale are the usual economic 
assumption—additional capital is productive, but not as productive as the first units. 
We can gain insight from the same sort of phase plane diagram, but with a  modified 
as required. Assume a  =  1/2. See Figure 4.7.
For this case and the same values for (so, A)) as before, consumption falls a t first— 
opposite from the constant returns case—but for larger values of co it rises near the
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Figure 4.7: Decreasing Returns to ScaJe, a  =  1/2
end. For small co, s is rapidly increasing near the end, which is inconsistent with 
our boundary value of s{T) =  0. These paths are not those which will be realized 
in practice. Unlike the constant returns case, we cannot know precisely which of the 
paths applies to Robinson, because we do not know eg for these assumptions.
There is an unstable saddle point (s,c) =  (0.36,5.04), at the intersection of the 
à =  0 and c =  0 lines. If co is roughly ten times sq =  1 then the path approaches the 
saddle, and then veers off either to increasing stock and slowly falling consumption 
or little stock and more consumption.
The third case is increasing returns to scale. One theory for the current success 
of the American economy is that its new information industries display increasing 
returns to scale due to, for example, the behavior of networks. W hatever the merits 
of that argument, we can model increasing returns by letting a  =  2. T hat is Figure
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4.8. It shows a different pattern &om the other two. As one might expect from more
Stock
3
. 5
2
. 5
1
. 5
Consumption10 15 205 25
Figure 4.8: Increasing Returns to Scale, a  = 2
promising technology, for most values of cq, consumption is higher than  for the other 
two cases, at most times. Consumption rises rapidly while stock may rise, then fall, 
until the path crosses the c =  0 line, from which point consumption also falls. Like 
the other two cases, here low stock, presumably associated w ith the end of the path 
under the boundary conditions we assume, usually leads to still lower levels of stock, 
but unlike the other cases, consumption may fall a t the end.
There is an unstable spiral in th e  increasing returns case when (s, c) % (.4167,1.458), 
the intersection of the s = 0 and c  =  0 lines, see Figure (4.9). Since points near this 
intersection are near equilibrium, they take a long time to develop. The paths in this 
figure are for T  =  3.
The increasing returns case is special in another way. Since a  > 1, we have that
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Figure 4.9: Unstable Spiral at (.4167, 1.458)
— c is convex and, from (4.13), p{t) > 0. Therefore (see text following (3.12)) the 
sufficient conditions for a maximum are not satisfied in this case.
In the phase plane diagrams, we can plot illustrative paths for given values of 
(so, Co), but Cq is an unknown. We have depicted the graph for various guesses for Cq. 
Another approach to this problem would start from a numerical solution for eg. S tart 
by reducing our system of two equations in unknowns s and c to a single non-linear 
second order ordinary differentiW equation in s. Differentiate (4.17) with respect to 
time, obtaining
c =  — s. (4.18)
Substitute (4.18) and (4.17) into (4.16) and obtain
s  =  s(2ro;s“ ' — d) — rs “ ( r a s “  ^ — d).a—I (4.19)
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W ith our usual boundary conditions on s, we may be able to  solve this numerically 
using the Nonlinear Shooting Method ([3] p. 632) or the Finite Difference Method 
for Nonlinear Problems ([3] p. 646). W ith these results, we could find eg and so find 
the appropriate optimal path. This is left for future work.
4.3 Phase Plane Diagrams with M athem atica
The phase plane diagrams in Section 4.2 were prepared with M athematica 3.0. a  soft­
ware program for m athem atical computing. In this section we review the instructions 
used to prepare the diagrams and export them. We review the a  =  1/2 case, (Figure 
4.7), which encompasses all the issues. The diagram  is built up from several sim­
pler graphs: (1) the vector field, (2) some illustrative trajectories, (3) s ,c  and s =  1 
curves, and (4) text. Then it is exported for use in DTfeX, the word processor used 
to prepare this paper.
Vector fields require a supplemental package, called with:
« G ra p h ic s  'P lo tF ie ld '
The first instructions spell out the specification assumptions (4.11) and vector field 
equations (4.17) and (4.16). 
r  = 8 .4 ;  d = 7; a  = 1 /2 ; 
e q l = c ( r  a  -  d ) ; eq2 = r  s° -  c;
The next instruction keeps Mathematica from “improving” the height to width 
ratio of the plot:
S e tO p tio n s [P lo tV ec to rF ie ld . A spectR atio  1 ];
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Finally, the plot is drawn and named “PVF” . Param eter values of s and c were 
chosen to make them consistent with the figures in section 4.1.
PVF = P lo tV ec to rF ie ld  [{ e q l,e q 2 } ,{ c ,0 ,3 0 } ,{ s ,0 ,3 } , Frame -¥ True];
The trajectories are paths for a given (so,co). Preparing these takes two steps, 
one to solve the equations numerically, and a second to prepare a parametric plot of 
the results. The instruction NDSolve solves the system of two nonlinear equations 
with initial conditions s(0) =  l,c (0 ) =  Cq; the Table instruction tells the software to 
prepare solutions for the values of cq from 5 to 20, in increments of 2.
ND = T a b le  [NDSolve [ { C  [ t ]  == c [ t ]  ( 8 .4  0 .5  ( s C t ] ) - * /^  -  7 .O),  
s ' [ t ]  = = 8 . 4  (s  Ct] ) -  c [ t ]  , s  [0] == 1 , c [0] == i } , { t , 0 , 1}] ,
{ i . 5 . 2 0 . 2 } ] ;
P h a lf  = PaLrametricPlot [E v a lu a te [ { c [t]  , s [ t ]  } , / . ND] , { t ,0 , l } ,  
PlotRange —^ {{0 ,30} ,{0 ,3}}, AxesLabel -> {"Consumption", "Stock"}]
Next, solve and plot the s =  0 and c =  0 lines:
SDotHalf = P lo t[c^  /  8 .4^ , {c ,0 ,3 0 } , P lo tS ty le  —> {T hickness[.0 0 5 ]} , 
PlotRange -> {{0 ,30} ,{0 ,3}}];
CDotHalf = P lo t [ .3 5 , {s , 0 , 30 }, P lo tS ty le  -4 {T hickness[.0 1 ]} . 
PlotRange -> {{0 ,30} ,{0 ,3}}];
The graphic also has a line for Sq =  1:
SOne = P lo t [ s [ t ] = = l ,  { t ,0 ,3 0 } , PlotRange -> {{0 ,30} ,{0 ,3}}];
Then, the labels:
TsDot = G rap h ics[T ex t["sd o t= 0 ", {18, 2 .9  }]]
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TcDot = G ra p h ic s [T e x tC " c d o t= 0 " ,  {27, .2  } ] ]
These are assembled in a single graphic by Show:
ShowHalf = Show [PVF, P h a lf , SD otH alf, CDotHalf, SOne, TsD ot, T cD ot]; 
Lastly, ShowHalf is exported from M athematica as an encapsulated postscript 
(EPS) file entitled “PHalf.eps” :
D is p la y  [ " P H a l f . e p s " ,  Show H alf, "EPS"].
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COMMAND ECONOMY
The Robinson Crusoe model is useful because the m athematics of even the simplest 
dynamic optim ization model is non trivial. However, it is not welfare economics. 
There is only one citizen! Issues of distribution of income among citizens cannot 
arise. We next look at the simplest model in which we can consider the distribution 
of economic welfare among citizens.
In the interest of keeping it simple, we consider an idealized state. It is more like 
a simplified communism than a simplified capitalism. Each of us contributes to the 
social welfare according to our ability. Marx rules us, which is far from suggesting 
the real Karl Marx was either benevolent or a ruler. Indeed, the gulf between our 
benevolent M arx and the dictators Karl Marx inspired exposes the magnitude of our 
abstraction. O ur Marx neither consumes nor produces himself, but he does allocate 
the social product among us according to a specific rule. There are no markets. There 
is no private property, no property rights, no contracts, no binding agreements. There 
are no disputes to arbitrate, since Marx is always right.
We first consider the utilitarian criterion for social welfare. M arx’s first job is to 
allocate consumption so as to maximize the sum of our utilities.
52
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5.1 The U tilitarian Model
Our society contains N  individuals, i =  1, 2 , . . .  iV. There are no births, no deaths, 
no immigrants and no emigrants. jV is a constant.
Again, we consider the time period of length T, t €  [0, T].
Each citizen produces a unique good. The stock of citizen i's good is s,-; at time 
t  i t  is  s , ( t ) .  Depending upon Marx’s decree, each citizen may consume some part of 
the goods offered by other citizens. Citizen f s  consumption of product i a t time t  is
At t =  0 there is an initial stock of each good, s, (0) =  A (real-valued) amount 
of good Si{t) may be consumed by any citizen, or applied to production of more of the 
same good. The good s, cannot be applied to the production of any other good, Sk, 
where k ^  i. Any stock S{ not consumed increases at the rate r,-. Hence the growth 
rate for each product s,- is
N
Si{t)  =  s , - ( t )r ,  - y i c i j ( t ) .
At ( =  T  everything will be consumed, s,(T ) =  0, Vi.
Our society cannot consume more than it has, and cannot consume negative 
amounts, so
Sj ( t )  ^  0, Cij{t) ^  0, Vi, Vj.
Each citizen derives utility from his or her consumption in the same way Robinson 
does. Citizen j ' s  utility function has the form Uj(t,Cij,C2j  ■. . c \ j ) .  Each function 
Uj is twice continuously differentiable in c, j  and once continuously differentiable in t,
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with ^  > 0, <  0 and ^  <  0, where c is any of the c ,j. We assume utility over
an interval is the integral of its rate (“time-additive” ).
As with Robinson, we assume the utility functions have a specific form to yield 
closed-form solutions. At time t, citizen j  accrues utility a t the following rate,
AT
Uj{t, c i j ,  C2 j  . . .  Cffj) =  e ^  ln{cij{t)),
i=l
where dj is a positive scalar measure of impatience. Then citizen j ' s  u tility  over the
interval [0,T] is:
pT N-
U j =  (5.1)
•'o ,=i
Finally we need to aggregate over all N  citizens, to get society’s welfare as a whole. We 
apply the utilitarian criterion and define society’s welfare W  as the sum of individual
welfare.
j=l i=l ® i=l
We have arrived at a statem ent of the problem. The problem is to  maximize the 
utilitarian social welfare functional,
N rT N
W
j=\ do :=1
subject to the growth constraints,
N
Si{t) =  Si{t)ri -  ^  Cij(t) z =  1,2 . . .  A, 
the boundary conditions,
s,(0) =  Si,o, Si{T) = 0 ,  z =  1 ,2 , . . .  A,
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and the transversality constraints,
Sj(t) ^  0, Cij(t) ^  0, z =  1 ,2 , . . .  A, j  =  1 ,2 , . . .  A.
First we can interchange the outer summation and the integral so as get W  in the 
correct form for a well-defined Hamiltonian.
•X AT \
w
• ' 0  j = l  t = l
Now we can form the Hamiltonian (sometimes suppressing the argum ents of functions 
to simplify the notation).
AT AT A /  AT \
H ^  ^  ln{c, j)  I s . r ,  -  ^  Qj ) ■
j  =  l i = l  i = l  V j = l  /
We take the partial of the Hamiltonian with respect to each citizen Vs consumption 
of each good k, c j^,
the stock of each good s/t,
d H
and each co-state variable p&, which returns us the constraint function,
d H  A
For our system to be at a maximum, these partial derivatives must satisfy the Pon- 
tryagin Maximum Principle (3.16).
 pic = 0, k =  1 ,2 ,. . .  A , 1 =  1,2, . . .A ,  (5.2)
Ck,i
PiçTk =  —Pk, k =  1 ,2 . . .  A, and (5.3)
jv
SkTic ~  k =  1 ,2 . . .  A. (o.4)
;=i
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Working first with (5.3), denoting with an asterisk * an optimal solution, and 
substituting the original indices for k and I in the following, we get:
Pi (() =  z =  1 ,2 , . . .  A.
where each ki,,- is the first set of arbitrary constants of integration, one for each i. 
Substituting this result into (5.2) and rearranging terms:
^t{rx-dj)
c,j(() =  r  ; i — 1 ,2 , . . .  A, =  1, 2 , . . .  A. (5.5)
Now, to tackle (5.4) recall the formula for the solution of a general first order differ­
ential equation([ll], p. 31). If
y' + y Pi{t) =  Ri{t), 
and Hi{t) =  /  Pi{t)dt, then, necessarily,
y(t) =  Ri{t)dx -r kj
Let Pi{t) =  —r, and
N
^  ^  e*(n - 4  )
3 =  1
Applying these
< ( t)  =  e'“ I , i =  1, 2 , . . .  A.
where each k  ^, is a second set of arbitrary constants of integration, one for each i. 
Upon simplifying we find
s*{t) =  ka.tc’’’ +  I =  1, 2 , . . .  A.
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Note that consumption c*j(t) (5.5) is an exponential, increasing over time if r ,—dj > 0, 
as it was in Robinson’s case (4.9). On the other hand, the path of consumption may 
differ for every individual j  and commodity i.
5.2 A General Social Welfare Functional
In the previous section, we implicitly assumed =  1 in the Sen SWF from chapter 2 
(2.2). Here we consider other values, so we have
for ^  0, ^  I. Hence;
W  = ^
This SWF weighs cumulative lifetime utility. It is difficult to work with mathemati­
cally. As an alternative, we can weigh utility instant by instant.
^  =  (3.6)
This later case might shift benefits to the temporarily impecunious and away from 
the temporarily flush. Whatever its philosophical merit, (5.6) is more mathematically 
tractable, so it is the case we consider.
We can form the Hamiltonian as before:
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Then we can take the Hamiltonian partials:
d H
dck,i
—dit
Ck,l - P k ,
where ui = e X lili
d H
dsk =  P kT k ,
and
d H  A
■g^ -  -  Z  '^ ‘4-
,=1
Though we will get something very different, we can use the Pontryagin Maximum 
Principle much as we did before, and derive optimal paths:
p*(0 =  ^i,.e ’■’S
g t { n - d j )
< j(()  =  — r----- , and«'1,1
(5.7)
/  (- z4 M  =  e""
For 0  = 1. the utilitarian case, this reduces to the same result as before, as it 
should. For ^  1 we have implicit functions for the c*j{t) since uj  is a function of 
c \ j { t ) ,  c ^ j ( t ) . . .  This system is difficult to solve explicitly. The same u j  term
makes interpretation of the stock function s*(t) more difficult.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
Here we review what we have found, and consolidate a review of areas for further 
work.
We explored the economist’s concept of utility as a prelude to  a more detailed 
treatm ent of a social welfare functionals. Setting aside the large literature which is 
difficult to mathematize, we considered a cardinal utility model suggested by Sen, 
in which the utilitarian and Bergsonian models appear as special cases. Next we 
reviewed the Pontryagin Maximum Principle in terms of functional analysis. We 
distilled from that m aterial a useful tool for necessary and sufficient conditions for 
optima in an infinite-dimensional constrained optimization problem.
Our first model is a  Robinson Crusoe society, and we applied the Pontryagin 
Maximum Principle in this simple context. Having chosen our model with care, we 
obtained closed form solutions for optimal stock, consumption and shadow prices as 
functions of continuous time. We also considered the effect on these results of changes 
in Robinson’s impatience and the productivity of his technology.
Next we considered how Robinson’s world would change if his technology was not 
homogeneous (of degree one), in other words, if returns to scale were not constant.
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We characterized the results in terms of phase plane diagrams, and described their 
preparation.
The conceptual heart of the paper is the command economy—how a benevolent 
dictator should allocate resources among citizens who contribute according to their 
skills, rather than their rewards. Unfortunately, our results were limited. We first 
worked-up the u tilitarian  case and then turned to  the less workable Sen model.
There are many ways to expand on this material. Here are some;
•  Our command economy has constant population. W hat happens if there is 
growth?
• We chose a finite time horizon. What if life goes on? How does an infinite time 
horizon problem differ? Could we consider a stochastic end point?
•  We chose a model of individual utility for its m athematical tractability. W hat 
if we choose a more nuanced model?
•  We could have added taxes on consumption, production or wealth. Is one tax 
structure preferred over the others?
•  We used phase plane analysis to examine returns to scale. We might have 
gained additional insight from a numerical solution, the approach to which we 
described.
•  We might have explored the command economy case in more detail, seeking a 
specification or approximation that yields a  solution of (5.7). Alternatively, it
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may be possible to find numerical solutions through application of the implicit 
function theorem.
•  If we assume there are two or three persons in the economy we may consider 
the effect of differences in their technologies, r , or their impatience, d, at least 
in the utilitarian case.
•  .John Rawls, a  philosopher, offers a maximin criterion [20]. His (long) book in 
two sentences: If we all got together before any of us were bom, not knowing 
what the luck of the draw might bring us, we would be very risk adverse. We 
would agree tha t the best rule would be to maximize the utility of the worst-off 
person, whoever that might be. This is the “maximin” criterion. It has been 
suggested ([23]) that the Sen SWF can also represent the maximin or Rawls 
SWF as a special case, if we take 0 —*■ —oo. We could explore this hypothesis 
and other ways to apply the maximin criterion.
•  We might also have considered altruism, where one citizen’s utility function has 
as arguments the utility (or consumption) of others.
• We might have explored the impact of substitution effects—where one good 
may be used in place of another. When substitution effects occur, the more 
good a is available, the less useful is good b. Similarly, we might have explored 
complements, where good a—say gas—has low utility unless good b—cars—is 
available.
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A dramatic expansion of the model would be to consider a m arket economy, 
and ask many of these same questions in tha t model.
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